Συνεκπαίδευση φρεγάτας «ΚΑΝΑΡΗΣ» με γερμανικό πλοίο στο Αιγαίο

China possesses a rapidly improving military that, in certain local or regional engagements, could match — and even defeat.
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/06/21/why-china-is-far-from-ready-to-meet-the-u-s-on-a-global-battlefront/
The past decade has “seen a major improvement in the scope and complexity of PLAN training that has paralleled the expansion in its missions, operations, and capabilities,” Rielage wrote. “Central to these are high-end naval combat tasks — the fundamentals of fleet action against a foreign navy intervening against People’s Republic of China (PRC) interests. While no training is a perfect facsimile of combat, the PLAN’s proficiency is increasing through this deliberate investment in more advanced and realistic training.”
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/may/chinese-navy-trains-and-takes-risks
US ‘might lose’ war against China or Russia, report to Congress says
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-war-china-who-win-russia-national-defence-strategy-congress-report-donald-trump-a8636866.html
Defense Department:
“the US military no longer enjoys an unassailable position versus state competitors,”
“it no longer caν automatically generate consistent and sustained local military superiority at range.”
“the jarring realization that ‘we can lose.’”
“self-image of a matchless global leader provides a flawed foundation for forward-looking defense strategy…under post-primacy conditions.”
China is engaged in a deliberate program to demonstrate the limits of US authority”
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1358.pdf
Both sides would suffer large military losses in a severe conflict. In 2015, U.S. losses could be a
relatively small fraction of forces committed, but still significant; Chinese losses could be much heavier
than U.S. losses and a substantial fraction of forces committed.
This gap in losses will shrink as Chinese A2AD improves. By 2025, U.S. losses could range from
significant to heavy; Chinese losses, while still very heavy, could be somewhat less than in 2015, owing
to increased degradation of U.S. strike capabilities.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140.synopsis.pdf
(είμαστε στα μέσα σχεδόν της 10ετιας που αναφέρει)
Οπότε η ατεκμηρίωτη θέση του άρθρου πως
“Το πρόβλημα για την Κίνα είναι πως επί του παρόντος, δεν μπορεί να αντιπαρατεθεί με μια αμερικανική αρμάδα στη Θάλασσα της Νότιας Κίνας. ” δεν ισχύει.
‘Μέχρι το Πεκίνο να μπορέσει να ναυπηγήσει ανάλογο στόλο αεροπλανοφόρων (και όχι μόνο), θα βασιστεί στις “λύσεις” που προαναφέραμε.’
Φυσικά η Κίνα δεν χρειάζεται τα αεροπλανοφόρα για να αντιπαρατεθεί με τις ΗΠΑ κοντά στην επικράτεια της. Από που προκύπτει κάτι τέτοιο;